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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the early stages of the highway construction program
in Poland. We argue that the whole investment process could be accelerated if
much attention was paid to establishing a better legal framework. Investigating
the bids for the A2 highway and the implementation of the concession agreement,
we highlight the excessive red tape and poor monitoring system which led to a
serious slowdown in the construction process. We also stress the necessity of
choosing the best adapted financing method for infrastructure investments, as
the use of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme has partially failed
because of its financial weakness.
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1 Introduction 2
1 Introduction
Among economists, there is a consensus concerning the need to improve
infrastructure, especially in the transport sector, which is seen as a necessary
condition for successful economic growth. However, in the case of a few, rather
successful transition countries, the problem of a poor transport infrastructure
had not yet been resolved. The best example is Poland, where the quality of
its transport infrastructure constitutes an important barrier to the country’s
development, especially in the context of European integration. Although the
total length of the roads is relatively high, Poland lacks the minimum required
standard of density of highways and expressways. In order to overcome this
unfortunate situation, the State authorities have decided to launch the “Infras-
tructure - A Key to Development” program, formulating radical changes in the
law as well as new methods of financing infrastructure projects. The core con-
cept of the government’s program was to turn to the private sector to provide
infrastructure improvements, basically highways. One motivation was very lim-
ited tax resources, which led to the State borrowing as much as it could from
development banks and private capital markets. A second motivation was the
hope that the private sector - motivated by profit - would be more efficient than
the State. The adopted solution was a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) con-
cept, in the form of long-term concession contracts.
In this paper we investigate the reasons why highway construction projects
have been delayed. We argue that some aspects of this unfortunate situation
could have been avoided if the predictions of Transaction Cost (TCT), as well
as Incomplete Contract (ICT) Theories had been taken into consideration. By
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1 Introduction 3
taking as an example the concession allocation for the first section of the A2
highway (supposed to link the eastern and western parts of the country) we
will explain why this project has partially failed. We enumerate some - in our
opinion - blatant errors by both public and private parties. We especially focus
on the control issue, as contract execution yielded flagrant deficiences. For each
step of the A2 PPP agreement we indicate at least one possible solution, as
they became evident from a theoretical point of view. To conclude, we propose
a brief confrontation of the lessons to be learned for the future, especially as the
new government program for land infrastructure has recently been published.1
Unfortunately, this project was never realized because of the high construc-
tion costs, an extremely low level of car ownership and - the most important
factor- the start of the 2nd World War. After the War, because of the frontier
change of about 250 km from East to West, Poland inherited 140 km of high-
ways built by the Germans. During the socialist era, there were only 117 km
of highway-like roads built, as well as 342 km of expressways. The relatively
low level of cars to the kilometer (in 1957: 20 cars/km in Germany, 18 cars/km
in France and only 3 cars/km in Poland) meant that the central planners paid
much less attention to the road infrastructure issue. In spite of the fact that
Poland had signed some COMECON co-operation agreements concerning the
development and modernization of the Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin road linkage, the
preparation for construction only started in 1980, as the necessity of this axis
became indispensable for the organization of the Olympic Games in Moscow. At
that time, the project of the future A2 highway was initiated and necessary land
1“Program Budowy Autostrad i Drog Ekspresowych w Latach 2006-2013”: national plan
for the construction of highways and expressways published by the Ministry of Infrastructure
January 19, 2006.
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2 Project schedule 4
was bought by the State. However, the construction process was frustrated until
the mid nineties, when the increase in lorry traffic became a serious problem.
2 Project schedule
Everybody who has ever been to Poland surely remembers its poor trans-
portation network. In the early 90’s, numerous ideas for financing highway
construction were proposed. None of them, however, were applied. A short
time later, the Polish government proposed the “National Plan for Highway
Construction” based upon a PPP method. The government was encouraged
by the World Bank’s “private participation in infrastructure” policy. Indeed,
by 1996, the project draft had been prepared. The program was launched in
early 1997 within the first successful concession auction biding. In 2001, public
opinion was shocked by the Supreme Chamber of Control report revealing that
in 1998-2000 0 km of highways were built in the four PPP concession schemes.2
After a stormy period in Parliament and media, followed by some ministers’ dis-
missal, no reconstruction project emerged. Therefore, one may ask, how could
this happen?
2Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli (NIK) - supreme state audit body. Its status is regulated by the
Constitution of April 1997 and by the NIK Act of 23 December 1994.
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3 The attribution problem 5
3 The attribution problem
3.1 The story
Under the Polish law on toll highways3 the building and exploitation of
an highway requires a limited three-step auction process, which leads to the
objective selection of the best concessionaire. The winning company for the
A2 highway was “Autostrada Wielkopolska SA”4. Following the winning ten-
der, the Concession Agreement was signed. As the concessionaire, “Autostrada
Wielkopolska SA” was initially bound to build and operate the first section
of the A2 Highway from Swiecko to Konin (the first segment of 148,7 km2).
Furthermore, “Autostrada Wielkopolska SA” did not become the owner of the
A2; it ensured the performance of the Concession Agreement for the term of 40
years, that is by 2037. The land on which the highway is built remains the prop-
erty of the State Treasury and the Company pays an annual rent to the State.
The party to the Concession Agreement on behalf of the Polish government is
the Minister of Infrastructure, while the body responsible for its implementa-
tion is the Highway Construction and Exploitation Agency. In order to meet
its obligation under the Concession Agreement, a Development Company was
established - “A2 Bau Development GmbH”(founded by the shareholders of
“AWSA”: “Strabag AG” and “NCC international AB”) which is responsible
31994 Toll Highways Act. The Act provides a legal framework for the construction of
highways (procedures for location of the highways, acquisition of property on which the high-
ways are to be built, tender proceedings, concessions for the construction and operation of
highways). The Act also regulates financial issues related to the construction of highways.
4“Autostrada Wielkopolska SA”, the first Polish special purpose entity incorporated in
1993 was founded in 1994 with the goal of financing, building and operating the A2 Toll
Highway. Its capital is made up with Polish and foreign shareholders’ funds.
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3.2 What went wrong? 6
for the construction, and the operating company - “Autostrada Eksploatacja
SA”(founded by the shareholders of “AWSA”: “Transroute International SA”,
“Kulczyk Holding SA” and “Strabag AG”). In order to ensure proper perfor-
mance under the contracts, in strict compliance with Polish law and the pro-
visions of the Project Agreements, the parties to the concession: the Minister
of Infrastructure and the Concessionaire, appointed an Independent Engineer
- “WS Atkins” from the UK, whose duty was to supervise the design process,
the construction and operation of the highway, as well as to oversee for the
proper execution and adequate quality of the work. Though on first sight the
contractual clauses seemed to be clear and sound, their interpretation and im-
plementation were baﬄing.
3.2 What went wrong?
As we have already mentioned, once the Concession agreement was signed,
a three-year period of astonishing inactivity in the construction process took
place. After analyzing the Concession contract, some issues remain, at least,
doubtful. Therefore, it seems clear that:
• The Concessionaire did not fulfill the definitive “commencement deadline
for the first segment ”, stipulated in the Concession contract for March
10, 1999. This situation resulted from the lack of financial closure for
the project. Indeed, some contract clauses were too lax, especially those
concerning the issue of risk distribution between the Concessionaire and
the State. Particularly, there were no clauses making clear the State’s
guarantees given to the Concessionaire for credit with investment banks
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3.2 What went wrong? 7
5. As a result, the Concessionaire was not able to finalize his financial
project.
• The other side of the same coin reveals that the auction jury members
(the State Agency) were (at least should be) in perfect possession of in-
formation on the financial situation of the bidders, as required for the
tender. Besides some restrictions on shareholders’ equity, there were some
other legal obligations such as minimum fund gathering by the Conces-
sionaire 6. Therefore, two possibilities emerge: either the jury members
were incompetent, or the contracting offer was incomplete.
5The Concessionaire was perfectly sure that (taking into consideration its equity weakness)
he would not be able to build without the State’s guarantees for credits. This is the best
example of the Concessionaire’s opportunism which is seen in his public statement stressing
that
“...based on the analysis of the toll revenues generated so far showing slight excess
over the assumed levels, it may be said that there is no risk that the State Treasury
guarantee will be exercised”.
6At the level of 100% coverage of the first segment. The final Financial Plan for the first
section was settled down in 2000 (!) and annexed to the initial Concession Agreement. The
lump sum contract price for the investment was agreed at EUR 875 million (EUR 637.5 milion
excluding indirect costs). The funds required to meet the foregoing costs came from three
major sources:
i equity coming from the Concessionaire’s shareholders accounting for more than 27% of the
total development cost;
ii loans in the form of the bond issue and supplier credit;
iii Senior Loan;
iv the loan from the European Investment Bank (never granted).
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3.3 What are the theoretical suggestions? 8
3.3 What are the theoretical suggestions?
When we look at the theory, some crucial questions must be clarified. Logi-
cally, one may ask whether a “perfect auction” exists. Surely, the trivial response
is “no”, but that does not explain some procedural errors. As highlighted by
Williamson [1976], the effectiveness of franchise bidding firstly depends on the
ability of the franchisor to characterize the service he wants to put to tender.
Yvrande-Billon [2005] explains that an adequate service specification is impor-
tant in franchising, first as a basis for competition in the bidding process and,
secondly, to set the benchmarks for evaluating bids. Therefore, it is impor-
tant for the franchisor to refine his call for tender as much as possible. If he
fails, the costs of bidding may increase and applicants may not be interested in
the auction, discouraged by the high uncertainty of the project. Furthermore,
as mentioned in Bajari et al.[2003], a vague description of the subject matter
of auction may lead to adverse selection and end by selection of the most op-
portunistic candidate. If the call for tender is incomplete and investment is
complex, the auction process may result in choosing the bidder who can exploit
the contractual blanks and thus may make the most of the fact that the con-
tract in question is likely to fail. A potential danger of this situation consists
in the opportunistic anticipation of a renegotiation of contract by the auction
winner, who may benefit from the financial compensation stipulated in avoid-
ance clauses.
Another problem with the auction process is intrinsic to the nature of concession
agreements. For instance Posner [1972] stresses that
“[p.113]...the concession method deprives the franchise system of one
of its most attractive features, ease of administration, since when
ha
ls
hs
-0
02
66
97
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
6 
M
ar
 2
00
8
3.3 What are the theoretical suggestions? 9
the franchise is awarded to the higher bidder the process of choosing
among applicants involves a minimum of administrative machinery
and official discretion”.
Indeed, the simplicity of the auction process could be preserved only if the
concession concerned less complex investment. In the case of infrastructure
concessions, one should remember that a highway concession in the PPP scheme
typically covers the financing, building and operating of a road. Thus, is there a
tenable means of anticipating for all factors? And, similarly, is there a solution
for internalizing the plurality of states of nature that might occur?
With respect to the transaction cost economics framework, in the case of an
undoubtedly incomplete long term contract, the extreme importance of the ex
ante stage, that is the auction process, become obvious. It follows that in the ex
ante stage it should be anticipated by the franchisor that contract renegotiation
will inevitably occur. Summarizing, it appears that the contract incompleteness
should be taken into consideration at the very beginning of the project.
On the other hand, one could imagine how difficult it is to decide ex ante what
has to be done ex post. We fully agree with Crocker and Masten [1996] who
argue that, as the transaction becomes more complex or uncertain, contracts
are likely to become more
“...’rational’ in character. Rather than attempting to lay out a de-
tailed specification of the terms of the agreement, relational con-
tracts attempt simply to establish the process through which fu-
ture terms of trade will be determined7, or, to establish, in effect, a
constitution governing the ongoing relationships”(Goldberg [1976],
7p.9
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3.4 What should have been done? 10
p.428).
Some remarks have to be made concerning the State guarantees for credit by
the Concessionaire. Because of the high risk associated with highway franchises,
lenders (investment banks) have refused to grant loans to the Concessionaire un-
less the government guarantee the debt. Engel et al.[2001] qualify this situation
as an usual pitfall for the State. Firstly, guarantees reduce the incentives for
lenders to screen projects and monitor their performance. A second danger con-
cerns the overestimation of demand such that the Concessionaire could not face
significant losses if traffic turns out to be below expectations, that is to say, the
whole investment might become a “white elephant”. In addition we argue that
bailing out the Concessionaire stands against the idea of PPP, where the State is
rather looking to be free of financial commitment, as its Treasury cannot afford
the investment alone. Therefore, we are pointing out that the liability of the
State8 in the case of the investment fiasco is excessive.
3.4 What should have been done?
We are trying here to enumerate some propositions in order to avoid an
impasse situation in the future. We do not claim a “miracle” solution. Never-
theless, it seems that the call for tender needs to be more explicit in that
the financing structure and risk sharing ought to be specified9. In our opinion,
the weakness of Polish equities constituted a sufficient incentive to broaden the
call for tender. A strong start-up capital mixed with the know-how of foreign
8By “the liability” we mean all legal responsibilities of the State excepting the statutory
ones, such as being the the party to the Concession agreement or the land owner.
9This can be done by simulating a least-present-value-of-revenue (LPVR) auction. For
details see Engel et al.[2002]
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4 The supervision problem 11
investors (capital groups) would have accelerated the construction. But, para-
doxically, foreign investors could not have felt attracted by the blanks in the
project and the low chances of taking money out. Therefore, a preliminary in-
dependent financial audit should always be welcomed. Finally, the presence of
clear and precise avoidance or retraction (annulation) clauses not only smoothes
bilateral relations but also creates an atmosphere of trust.
4 The supervision problem
4.1 The story
The Ministry of Infrastructure entrusted the supervision of highway con-
struction to The Highways Construction and Exploitation Agency (HCEA).
This is a common example of delegation of authority, as The Head of Agency
accomplishes public management and supervision tasks on behalf of the Gov-
ernment. We notify that The Head of Agency is directly subordinate to his
administrative superior, and thus, supposed to execute his decisions. In the
case of the A2 Concession, however, the coordination between those two insti-
tutions was not as smooth and efficient as it should have been.
As we remember from the previous section, the construction of the first seg-
ment of the A2 did not start because of the lack of financial closure. In order to
avoid this unfortunate situation in the future, the Concession Agreement was
annexed, providing a new deadline for financial closure. Furthermore, there were
some new clauses setting forth the possibility of cancellation once the deadline
was passed. The new deadline was scheduled for the end of July, and, unfor-
tunately, was also missed. In this case, the Concession Agreement should have
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4.2 What are the theoretical suggestions? 12
been cancelled by the State. But it did not happen. In spite of the Ministry
of Infrastructure’s wish to cancel, the Director of HCEA promoted his own vi-
sion of problem resolution, wanting to spread the Concession Agreement over
a new consortium. This free-rider behavior was tolerated by The Minister of
Infrastructure, who surely knew that - from the legal point of view - a kind
of substitution of the Concession party was not possible (a new auction would
have been required). Furthermore, the incorporation idea was a disaster, as the
Concessionaire (AW SA) would never agree to integrate with another firm, as
it was not interested in sharing profits. It is also important to mention that
the contract renegotiation feasibility studies ordered by the HCEA cannot be
considered as objective, since the audit provider company (PriceWaterhouseC-
oopers) was formerly hired by the AW SA as a consultant body to negotiate the
initial Concession Agrement.
4.2 What are the theoretical suggestions?
In the face of the story above, one can imagine that the public agency is a
haven for inefficiency. However, this is a very simplistic view of reality. Gener-
ally, the “bureaucratic”inefficiencies (as we think they should be called) result
from the lack of coordination in the decision-making process. In the TCT,
the governance structure mainly depends on the asset specificity (nature of in-
vestment), degree of uncertainty and type of transaction (and its frequency)10.
Therefore, in our case, “internalization” of Concession management and its
follow-up in the form of hierarchy was appropriate. The problems rather come
from misunderstanding of the authority-hierarchy relation. It should be remem-
10For an exhaustive review of organizational theory see Menard [1996].
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4.2 What are the theoretical suggestions? 13
bered that
“ we can talk about hierarchical relations between the subsets of
participants A and B when the subset B refers to the subset A’s goals
rather than to its own in decision-making process and subordinates
to A’s decision in the case of conflict”. (Guillaume [1972])
When we turn to analyze the situation between the public agency (The High-
ways Construction and Exploitation Agency) and its superior (The Ministry of
Infrastructure) we can ascertain the lack of acceptance and validation of hier-
archy by the public agency. There were two reasons for non-execution of the
superior’s decision: firstly, the conflict of goals, and secondly, the acquiescence
to insubordination. The latter results from the absence of a control mechanism.
Furthermore, the control procedures undertaken by the superior and thus aimed
at the subordinates are necessary for the execution of the decisions. It follows
that the inefficiency of the State in the Concession-managing process was a di-
rect consequence of the “weak” coercive mechanism. It is important to add that
an efficient control procedure depends on an adequate span of control11. As we
have already mentioned, the superior’s decisions were ignored by the intermedi-
ary link in the hierarchical chain, namely the Minister’s Secretary General. In
spite of the fact that the hierarchical structure was simple, and thus the span
of control limited (only one intermediary level), serious inefficiencies resulted.
The lack of control regarding the final subordinate - the Concessionaire (and
the party of agreement at the same time !) had also contributed to the invest-
11The span of control (SOC) is a simple managerial construct which identifies or regulates
the amount of direct supervision that exists between a superior and his direct subordinates
within an organization. For further readings see Yassine [2005]
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4.2 What are the theoretical suggestions? 14
ment fiasco. By adapting the initial Calvo-Wellisz [1978] model to the grantor-
concessionaire relation, we will show the extreme importance of supervision.
Primarily, we assume that the concessionaire’s utility index (U) depends on its
future profit12 (Π), and effort (e):
U = u(Π)− v(e), (1)
Π ≥ 0, 0 ≤ e ≤ 1,
and u′ ≥ 0, v′ ≥ 0, u′′ ≤ 0, v′′ ≥ 0. If e = 1, the concessionaire is fully effective;
if e = 0, he is completely idle. The presence of a monitoring system implies
that the supervision of the concessionaire’s effort (i.e. progress of investment) is
less costly than the direct measurement of his marginal product. Furthermore,
effective supervision requires the imposition of penalties for substandard work.
Let P be the probability of the concessionaire task being checked by his superior
(i.e. The Highways Construction and Exploitation Agency). If the concession-
aire is not checked, he is presumed to have made the maximum effort (e = 1)
and he is given a credit guarantee g (measured in units of future discounted toll
revenue). On the other hand, if the concessionaire’s real performance is checked,
his level of effort e is revealed and he gets only a part of credit guarantee eg,
involving a penalty equal to (1−e)g. Assuming profit equals guarantee of credit
attribution, expected utility, γ, associated with selecting a level of effort equal
to e is given by:
γ = P [u(eg)− v(e)] + (1− P )[u(g)− v(e)] (2)
12We assume that this is the present value of future tool incomes, and may be approximately
given as LPVR.
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4.2 What are the theoretical suggestions? 15
In his turn, the concessionaire chooses e in order to maximize his welfare and
defines
Γ(P, g) = max
0≤e≤1
γ (3)
For simplicity, we also assume that there exists a unique e associated with (3)
and denote it
e = E(P, g) (4)
Thus, it is easy to see that
∂E
∂P
≥ 0 (5)
and
∂E
∂g
≥ 0 ∪ ∂E
∂g
< 0 (6)
Proposition 1 The implementation of a supervision scheme increases the level
of effort of the supervisee. At the same time, one cannot be sure whether ap-
plication of penalties in the case of substandard work has a negative or positive
impact on the supervisee’s performance. It is important to say that the very
awareness of being checked works as an incentive mechanism, as each and every
supervisee prefers not to be checked. It follows that for a supervisor, providing
a spontaneous and random check seems to be the optimal solution.
Proof 1 (Immediate)
For any function E(), we know that e ≥ 0, P > 0 and g ≥ 0. In order to define
the sign of partial derivatives of E(), we simply apply their definition formulas.
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4.3 What should have been done? 16
E′P (P0, g0) =
∂E
∂P
(P0, g0) = lim
P→P0
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(P, g0)−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(P0, g0)
P − P0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
E′g(P0, g0) =
∂E
∂g
(P0, g0) = lim
g→g0
E(P0, g)− E(P0, g0)
g − g0︸ ︷︷ ︸
sign undetermined
¥
4.3 What should have been done?
From now on it is clear, that the Concession agreement should have been
unilaterally and immediately cancelled at the second financial closure dead-
line. The Infrastructure Ministry should have ordered its cancellation by
his subordinate (i.e. Chief of The Highways Construction and Exploitation
Agency). Tolerating the Concessionaire’s inactivity brought about by two con-
secutive financial closures led to a contract renegotiation procedure (the renego-
tiation clauses added to the concession agreement constitute a brand new text,
totally cancelling the initial one, so it is really difficult to call it a “rider”).
Furthermore, the renegotiation process placed the State in a suppliant position.
Finally, once the renegotiation had occurred, the State party should not have
agreed to make the new text confidential, firstly, because the investment in-
volved public expenditure and secondly, because the confidentiality excluded an
independent audit.
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5 Conclusion 17
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have emphasized the most striking problems which affected
the very early stages of a highway construction program in Poland. The PPP
concept failed to become successful because of the errors committed during the
auction process. In the case of the A2 highway concession, it seems that the pre-
qualification step was skimped, making impossible to shortlist bidders with the
required financial means and expertise. A way to avoid this kind of situation in
the future is to strengthen the domestic capital market. Strong domestic finance
is preferable, all else being equal, because it raises fewer political sensitivities and
avoids the complications of exchange rate risks. At the other extreme, it appears
that more consideration should be given to the use of concession contracts that
are shorter and simpler, so that they have a greater chance of being complete.
It is also clear that the management of concession agreements should be sim-
plified and monitoring schemes ought to be implemented in order to prevent a
contractor’s opportunistic and/or free-rider behavior. Finally, the State should
be extremely careful while delegating authority: as we have seen, softening of
subordination in the hierarchical chain may lead to bureaucratical pitfalls one
rather than of its more desirable features, such as ease of administration instead.
It is important to mention that the A2 highway construction is continuing, in
spite of the renegotiation process, and one may expect that it will be possible to
reach the German border by 2008. It seems that the government has learned its
lesson and is keen to engage more budgetary sources in infrastructure projects.
It has very strong monetary incentives to do so, as Poland will receive substan-
tial aid from EU funds (the EU budget for 2007-2013 projects EUR 91 bn for
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5 Conclusion 18
Poland, roughly EUR 20 bn of which will be spent on road and highway con-
struction). Nevertheless, extreme vigilance is required concerning its spending.
The Ministry of Infrastructure’s recent statement informs us that the “govern-
ment’s ambition” is to use all resources assigned for road construction, as in
2005 Poland had used only 63% of all funds available for this purpose. Finally,
the recent experiments with a new financing system called “Special Purpose
Issue” need to be watched, as the bureaucratic machinery is not very keen on
recognizing its own errors.
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